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THE PROPER APPELLATE STANDARD OF REVIEW 
FOR PTAB FACTUAL FINDINGS MADE 
INCIDENTAL TO CLAIM CONSTRUCTION 
A. David Brzozowski II+ 
In 2011, President Obama signed the America Invents Act (AIA), enacting 
the most significant changes to U.S. patent law since the 1952 Patent Act.1  The 
AIA revolutionized both the prosecution and litigation of patents primarily by 
creating post-grant patent opposition proceedings at the U.S. Patent and 
Trademark Office (PTO), such as inter partes review (IPR), post-grant review 
(PGR), and covered-business-method review (CBM).2  These opposition 
proceedings are intended to provide cost-effective alternatives to district court 
litigation.3  IPRs and PGRs are trial-like proceedings conducted before a panel 
of three administrative patent judges at the Patent Trial and Appeal Board 
(“PTAB” or “Board”).4  Since September 16, 2012, when the PTAB began 
accepting petitions for AIA proceedings, there have been nearly 6,000 petitions 
for IPR alone.5 
Despite the AIA’s support from the intellectual property community at its 
enactment and the wide popularity of the proceedings created by the AIA, 
certain aspects of the new system have been controversial.6  Specifically, federal 
judges and patent practitioners are debating which standard of review courts 
                                                 
 + J.D. Candidate, May 2018, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law; B.A. 
2012, The University of Connecticut.  The author wishes to thank the professors and alumni of the 
Catholic University who provided their support and guidance.  The author also wishes to thank the 
Catholic University Law Review staff members and editors for their hard work during the editing 
of this Comment. 
 1. Press Release, Office of the Press Sec’y, President Obama Signs America Invents Act, 
Overhauling the Patent System to Stimulate Economic Growth, and Announces New Steps to Help 
Entrepreneurs Create Jobs (Sept. 16, 2011), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-
office/2011/09/16/president-obama-signs-america-invents-act-overhauling-patent-system-stim. 
 2. H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, pt. 1, at 80–81, 145–47, 150–51 (2011), as reprinted in 2011 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 67, 105–06, 109. 
 3. See 157 CONG. REC. S5,326, 5,327 (daily ed. Sept. 6, 2011) (statement of Sen. Leahy). 
 4. H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, pt. 1, at 91. 
 5. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD 
STATISTICS 2 (Nov. 30, 2016), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/aia_statisti 
cs_november2016.pdf (outlining the combined number of IPR, CBM, and PGR petitions received). 
 6. Matt Cutler, 3 Years of IPR: A Look at the Stats, LAW360 (Oct. 9, 2015, 3:59 PM), http 
s://www.law360.com/articles/699867/3-years-of-ipr-a-look-at-the-stats (outlining the popularity of 
IPR proceedings with petitioners but suggesting that Congress, the courts, and the PTO may all 
have modifications to IPR proceedings in the near future). 
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should apply to the factual findings made by the PTAB during AIA opposition 
proceedings.7 
For over seventeen years, the Federal Circuit, in interpreting the Supreme 
Court’s holding in Dickinson v. Zurko,8 has reviewed all factual findings made 
at the Patent Office under the substantial evidence standard of the 
Administrative Procedure Act (APA).9  However, citing the adjudicatory nature 
of PTAB proceedings and the purpose and intent of the AIA, certain Federal 
Circuit judges, as well as others in the intellectual property community, have 
argued that substantial evidence is the incorrect standard.10 
Federal Circuit judges recently debated this issue in Merck & Cie v. Gnosis 
S.P.A.11 in which the Federal Circuit reviewed a PTAB decision that invalidated 
a patent for obviousness.12  The panel majority applied the standard in In re 
Gartside,13 holding that the appellate court must review factual findings made 
by the PTAB relating to a determination of obviousness under the substantial 
evidence standard.14  Judge Newman sharply dissented.15  She argued that 
substantial evidence is too deferential to affect the AIA’s purpose of having 
courts spot and correct the PTAB’s errors and, thus, argued that the court should 
review PTAB’s factual findings for clear error.16 
Judge Newman’s opinion coincided with the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc.17 several months earlier.  In 
Teva, the Court held that the Federal Circuit should review a district court’s 
factual findings during claim construction for clear error per the express wording 
of Rule 52(a)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.18  Although differences 
                                                 
 7. Alana Canfield Mannigé, Note, The Standard of Review for Claim Construction in Inter 
Partes Review, 8 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 157, 169–71 (2016). 
 8. 527 U.S. 150 (1999). 
 9. See, e.g., GraftTech Int’l Holdings, Inc. v. Laird Techs., Inc., 652 Fed. App’x 973, 975 
(Fed. Cir. 2016) (“We review the PTAB’s . . . factual findings for substantial evidence.”); Brand v. 
Miller, 487 F.3d 862, 868 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“[F]indings of fact by the [PTAB] must in all cases be 
supported by substantial evidence in the record.”); see also In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305, 1315 
(Fed. Cir. 2000). 
 10. See, e.g., Merck & Cie v. Gnosis S.P.A., 808 F.3d 829, 840 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (Newman, 
J., dissenting). 
 11. 808 F.3d 829 (Fed. Cir. 2015), reh’g denied, 820 F.3d 432 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 
 12. Id. at 831. 
 13. Gartside, 203 F.3d at 1315. 
 14. Merck, 808 F.3d at 832. 
 15. Id. at 839 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
 16. See id. at 840–41, 845. 
 17. 135 S. Ct. 831 (2015). 
 18. Id. at 836.  The Supreme Court held in relevant part that: 
[FRCP] 52(a)(6) states that a court of appeals “must not . . . set aside” a district court’s 
“[f]indings of fact” unless they are “clearly erroneous.”  In our view, this rule and the 
standard it sets forth must apply when a court of appeals reviews a district court’s 
resolution of subsidiary factual matters made in the course of its construction of a patent 
claim. 
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exist between the appellate review of district court decisions and the review of 
administrative agency decisions, certain members of the public have argued that 
the clear error standard of review for district court factual findings related to 
claim construction should also be the standard of review for the PTAB’s factual 
findings relating to claim construction.19 
This Comment seeks to examine the arguments for and against whether courts 
should review factual findings made incidental to claim construction under the 
substantial evidence standard (as provided by the APA) or the clearly erroneous 
standard (as provided in Teva).  This Comment begins with a discussion of the 
relevant history and application of claim construction in patent litigation cases, 
and how the PTAB has evolved under the AIA.  This Comment will then explore 
relevant Supreme Court cases and discuss the views of certain critics and 
supporters of the substantial evidence and clear error standards of review applied 
to PTAB factual findings made in AIA proceedings.  Ultimately, this Comment 
concludes that courts should review factual findings made during claim 
construction for clear error. 
I.  HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF CLAIM CONSTRUCTION AND THE 
EMERGENCE OF THE VARIOUS STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
A.  Claim Construction in District Court Litigation 
Claim construction determines what the terms in a patent claim mean to a 
person having ordinary skill in the relevant art.20  Often the meaning of a term 
affects the scope of the claim and consequently affects the determination of 
infringement and validity.21  Therefore, the determination of a claim term’s 
meaning will impact the “metes and bounds” of a patent.22  During claim 
construction, “[l]inguistically minor variations in phraseology and meaning can 
be the difference between a finding of infringement . . . and non-infringement.”23  
As the late Federal Circuit Judge Giles Rich observed, in patent litigation, “the 
name of the game is the claim.”24 
                                                 
Id. (alteration in original). 
 19. Thomas L. Irving et al., Teva’s Effect on Review of PTAB Claim Construction Rulings, 
LAW360 (May 11, 2015, 10:04 AM), https://www.law360.com/articles/650953/teva-s-effect-on-
review-of-ptab-claim-construction-rulings. 
 20. 1 MARK A. LEMLEY ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL 
AGE: 2016 III-182 (Clause 8 2016). 
 21. Id. at III-170. 
 22. Id. at III-166. 
 23. Id. 
 24. See Giles S. Rich, Extent of Protection and Interpretation of Claims – American 
Perspectives, 21 INT’L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 497, 499 (1990). 
168 Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 67:165 
Claim construction is a matter of law.25  In Markman v. Westview 
Instruments,26 the Supreme Court posited that judges—rather than juries—were 
better equipped to construe the meaning of complex patent claim terms because 
of their training and experience interpreting written instruments, like statutes or 
contracts.27  A term’s meaning, however, will often involve a factual dispute.28  
After limited discovery and briefing, district courts normally hold a pre-trial 
hearing where the parties and their experts explain why the court should adopt 
their definition of a term or terms.29  These hearings, known as claim 
construction, or Markman, hearings30 are critical in many cases because the 
court’s rulings may provide the basis for a summary judgment determination on 
issues of validity and infringement.31 
B.  Post-Grant Patent Reexamination and Relevant Changes to the Patent Act 
Prior to the AIA, there were several related and important developments in 
the field of U.S. patent law.32  The first major development was the patent 
                                                 
 25. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 372 (1996). 
 26. Id. 
 27. See LEMLEY ET AL., supra note 20, at III-170 (interpreting Markman, 517 U.S. at 372).  
The Supreme Court explained: 
The construction of written instruments is one of those things that judges often do and 
are likely to do better than jurors unburdened by training in exegesis.  Patent construction 
in particular “is a special occupation, requiring, like all others, special training and 
practice.  The judge, from his training and discipline, is more likely to give a proper 
interpretation to such instruments than a jury; and he is, therefore, more likely to be right, 
in performing such a duty, than a jury can be expected to be.” 
Markman, 517 U.S. at 388–89 (quoting Parker v. Hulme, 18 F. Cas. 1138, 1140 (1849)). 
 28. See, e.g., id. at 374–75. 
 29. See generally J. Michael Jakes, Using an Expert at a Markman Hearing: Practical and 
Tactical Considerations, FINNEGAN (Aug. 2002), http://www.finnegan.com/resources/articles/art 
iclesdetail.aspx?news=e3962a13-b898-4102-8fca-171c656a6ed2. 
 30. See LEMLEY ET AL., supra note 20, at III-171.  See generally James Ware & Brian Davy, 
The History, Content, Application and Influence of the Northern District of California’s Patent 
Local Rules, 25 SANTA CLARA COMPUT. & HIGH TECH. L.J. 965 (2012) (discussing the role the 
Northern District of California played in developing the first set of patent local rules). 
 31. See LEMLEY ET AL., supra note 20, at III-171.  Another reason the Supreme Court decided 
to make claim construction a judicial, rather than a jury, decision was to “bring claim construction 
out into the open.”  With claim construction in the province of judges, there is “voluminous 
jurisprudence” regarding how to construe patent terms and claims.  Id. 
 32. See generally John M. Golden, Working Without Chevron: The PTO as Prime Mover, 65 
DUKE L.J. 1657 (2016).  Among these many major changes have been: 
(1) the emergence of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit as the primary, 
day-to-day judicial expositor of patent law; (2) the U.S. Supreme Court’s temporary 
withdrawal from and subsequent return to being a regular active player in substantive 
patent law; and (3) the rise of jurisdictions, such as the Eastern District of Texas and 
District of Delaware, as favorite fora for patent disputes. 
Id. at 1660–61 (footnotes omitted).  Professor Golden notes, “from a relatively modest Jacksonian 
agency with limited responsibilities after the initial examination and granting of patent applications, 
the [PTO] has emerged as an adjudicatory forum that competes with courts in reviewing the validity 
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reexamination statute in the Patent and Trademark Law Amendments Act of 
1980.33  This statute, also known as the Bayh-Dole Act, was intended to “restore 
confidence in the validity of patents and thereby spur investment in new 
technologies” through the creation of a “system of administrative reexamination 
of doubtful patents.”34  As the first federal statute to create a patent 
reexamination process, this statute is the predecessor of later reexamination 
statutes, including the AIA.35 
Proceedings under the Bayh-Dole Act were ex parte, meaning that after a third 
party filed a petition for reexamination, only the patent owner could participate 
in the proceeding, if instituted.36  Furthermore, the statute limited examiners to 
reviewing issues of prior art, lack of novelty, and obviousness, and to admitting 
“patents, printed publications, and affidavits” as evidence, thereby preventing 
claims of fraud, abandonment, and concealment from being heard.37  These 
patent reexaminations took several years to complete.38  Consequently, many 
defendants did not view this process as a viable option, especially given that they 
often ended up litigating reexaminations anyway.39 
Roughly two decades later in 1999, Congress passed the Intellectual Property 
and Communications Omnibus Reform Act, also known as the American 
Inventors Protection Act.40  It created an inter partes reexamination process by 
which a third party could request reexamination of an issued patent, and the 
requesting party could respond to any responses submitted by the patent owner.41  
Although the American Inventors Protection Act expanded the reexamination 
process to include inter partes reexamination, petitioners seldom used inter 
partes reexamination to challenge patent validity outside of litigation.42  This 
unpopularity can be explained by the process’s co-option by accused infringers 
                                                 
of original patent grants.”  Id. at 1658 (footnotes omitted).  He highlights that the PTO has “grow[n] 
into an agency with a multibillion-dollar annual budget, [and] over ten thousand employees.”  Id. 
at 1661. 
 33. Patent and Trademark Law Amendments Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015 
(1980) (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 200–212 (2012)). 
 34. Eric J. Rogers, Ten Years of Inter Partes Patent Reexamination Appeals: An Empirical 
View, 29 SANTA CLARA COMPUT. & HIGH TECH. L.J. 305, 310 (2013) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 96-
1307, pt. 1, at 3 (1980)). 
 35. Id. 
 36. See LEMLEY ET AL., supra note 20, at III-161. 
 37. Id.; see also Rogers, supra note 34, at 316–17. 
 38. LEMLEY ET AL., supra note 20, at III-161. 
 39. Id.; see also Rogers, supra note 34, at 319–20.  Congress’s first attempt at creating an ex 
parte reexamination review board also drew heavy criticism as “[m]any people felt that the [ex 
parte reexamination] was an unattractive alternative to litigation because a capably represented 
[patent owner], by using a litigation-sized budget, could tilt the odds heavily in his or her favor.”  
Rogers, supra note 34, at 310. 
 40. Consolidated Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113 Stat. 1501A-552 (1999). 
 41. See Rogers, supra note 34, at 310. 
 42. Id. at 311. 
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as a litigation tactic to forestall an injunction against them.43  Subsequently, 
district court judges have criticized inter partes reexamination.44 
During the 2000s, patent reform efforts again gained momentum.  The focus 
of such reforms called for “a more robust administrative review process 
paralleling the European Patent Office’s opposition system.”45  After several 
years, those efforts resulted in the AIA.46  The AIA established three review 
procedures: inter partes review (IPR), post-grant review (PGR), and covered-
business-method review (CBM).47  Inter partes reexaminations were replaced 
with IPRs, and PGR and CBM reviews were established for the first time.48  The 
IPR statute allows anyone, except the patent owner, to petition the Patent Office 
to review the patentability of any claim in a patent under Sections 102 (novelty) 
and 103 (obviousness) of the 1952 Patent Act based on patents and printed 
publications.49 
Similarly, PGRs allow anyone other than the patent owner to challenge the 
patentability of any claim in a patent, but the request must be filed within nine 
months of the patent’s issuance.50  PGR grounds for patent review, however, are 
broader than those for an IPR, as a petitioner can challenge patentability under 
Sections 101, 102, 103, and 112 of the Patent Act, including double patenting.51  
The petitions are reviewed by a panel of three administrative patent judges in 
what is now known as the Patent Trial Appeal Board (previously, the Board of 
Patent Appeals and Interferences (BPAI)).52 
As with prior patent reform efforts,53 Congress intended to create an efficient 
alternative to district court litigation and to improve the quality of the patent 
                                                 
 43. Id. at 319. 
 44. Id. at 320–21. 
 45. See LEMLEY ET AL, supra note 20, at III-160. 
 46. 157 CONG. REC. S5326, 5327 (daily ed. Sept. 6, 2011) (statement of Sen. Leahy). 
 47. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
 48. See LEMLEY ET AL, supra note 20, at III-163; see also Golden, supra note 32, at 1666 
(“[These proceedings under the AIA] notably empower the PTAB to conduct more trial-like 
proceedings than those previously conducted by the PTO.  Further, [these] reviews permit a broader 
range of potential validity challenges than were previously available in PTO post-issuance 
proceedings.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 49. 35 U.S.C. § 311(a), (b) (2012). 
 50. Id. § 321. 
 51. Jason Mock, Post-Grant Proceedings at the USPTO and the Rising Tide of Federal 
Circuit Appeals, 25 FED. CIR. B.J. 15, 20 (2015). 
 52. See LEMLEY ET AL, supra note 20, at III-161 (The PTAB is the “successor to the pre-AIA 
[BPAI].”); see also Golden, supra note 32, at 1663 (“By statute, the PTAB’s membership consists 
of the PTO’s Director and Deputy Director, the Commissioners for Patents and for Trademarks, 
and administrative patent judges.”).  The administrative judges are appointed by the Secretary of 
Commerce in consultation with the Director.  Golden, supra note 32, at 1663. 
 53. See Rogers, supra note 34, at 310 (“Congress’ purpose in establishing the reexam 
procedure [under the Bayh-Dole Act] in 1980 was to ‘strengthen[] investor confidence in the 
certainty of patent rights by creating a system of administrative reexamination of doubtful patents.’” 
(quoting H.R. REP. NO. 96-1307, pt. 1, at 3 (1980))). 
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system.54  Similar to district court litigation, “most invalidity decisions require 
that the PTO first engage in claim construction.”55  But unlike district court 
litigation, which uses “ordinary and customary meaning” (OCM) to construe the 
claims of a patent,56 the PTAB uses the broadest reasonable interpretation (BRI) 
standard for claim construction.57  Unsurprisingly, claim construction plays an 
important role in the PTAB’s decision to institute a trial and in rendering its final 
decision, much like in district court litigation.58 
Since IA proceedings began in 2012, there have been a striking number of 
petitions filed with the PTAB.59  To handle the inflow of cases, the PTAB tripled 
the number of judges on the Board.60  Some commentators have stated that the 
number of petitions, in comparison to the number of requests filed under the 
previous administrative framework, underscores the PTAB’s role in patent 
law.61 
The PTAB issues hundreds of final decisions each year.62  To build and 
maintain their robust patent portfolios, many companies appeal these decisions 
to the Federal Circuit.63  Because of the sharp increase in the number of PTAB 
                                                 
 54. See LEMLEY ET AL., supra note 20, at III-162; see also H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, at 48 
(2011), as reprinted in 2011 U.S.C.C.A.N. 67, 78.  Lemley cites the Committee, which stated: “The 
Committee believes that this new, early-stage process for challenging patent validity and its clear 
procedures for submission of art will make the patent system more efficient and improve the quality 
of patents and the patent system.”  H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, at 48 (2011), as reprinted in 2011 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 67, 78. 
 55. Mannigé, supra note 7, at 163. 
 56. Id. at 160. 
 57. Id. at 163; see also 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) (2016) (“A claim in an unexpired patent . . . 
shall be given its broadest reasonable construction in light of the specification of the patent in which 
it appears.”). 
 58. See James Stein et al., Spotlight on Claim Construction Before PTAB, 11 BUFF. INTELL. 
PROP. L.J. 73, 74–75 (2015) (“Claim construction plays a key role both in the institution decision 
and in the ultimate final written decision. . . . PTAB has to construe the claims to review the 
patentability of a challenged claim against the grounds of unpatentability asserted in the petition.”).  
As a result of the ability of challengers to a patent to institute proceedings prior to the patent even 
being granted, “the new AIA post-grant proceedings mean that PTAB is a whole new audience that 
must be taken into account when drafting patent applications.”  Id. at 75. 
 59. See Golden, supra note 32, at 1667 (“From mid-2014 through the third quarter of 2015, 
filings for inter partes post-issuance proceedings before the PTAB arrived at a rate of about 150 
per month . . . . The demand for resolution of such ex parte appeals is relentless: as of September 
2015, the PTAB faced a backlog of over twenty thousand pending ex parte appeals.”). 
 60. See id. at 1667–68 (“The BPAI had eighty-one judges in 2010 . . . . By August 2015, the 
PTAB had 235 members, almost triple the BPAI’s 2010 membership.”). 
 61. See, e.g., id. at 1666–67 (“[T]he number of cases already under PTAB review attest to its 
substantial role in the post-AIA power structure of U.S. patent law.”). 
 62. See Mock, supra note 51, at 28 (“[T]he PTAB has been issuing hundreds of decisions 
annually, and it will likely continue to do so.”). 
 63. See id. at 28 (“Considering the gravity of these decision to patent owners’ portfolios, 
many, if not most, of these decisions will likely be appealed to the Federal Circuit.”); see also U.S. 
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FED. CIRCUIT, FILINGS OF PATENT INFRINGEMENT APPEALS FROM 
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decisions, some commentators have questioned whether the Federal Circuit can 
balance its current caseload with these new PTAB appeals.64  Thus, for the sake 
of efficiency and justice, the Federal Circuit must apply the correct standard of 
review to the PTAB’s factual findings. 
C.  The Substantial Evidence Standard of Review 
The Federal Circuit began applying the substantial evidence standard to 
appeals from the Patent Office following the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Dickinson v. Zurko.65  Before Zurko, the Federal Circuit reviewed the Board’s 
factual findings for clear error.66  Zurko started as an appeal to the Federal Circuit 
from a final determination by the BPAI that a patent applicant’s method to 
increase the security of computers was obvious in view of the prior art.67 
On appeal, the Federal Circuit held the Board’s factual findings regarding 
obviousness were “clearly erroneous.”68  However, to clarify the issue regarding 
the standard of review, the Federal Circuit heard the matter en banc.69  After 
examining the legal and policy precedents, a per curiam Federal Circuit held that 
“the stricter . . . standard [of clearly erroneous] was legally proper.”70  In 
justifying its reliance on the clear error standard, the Federal Circuit determined 
that Congress excluded the Board from the APA.71  Additionally, the Federal 
                                                 
THE U.S. DISTRICT COURTS, http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/the-court/statist 
ics/FY16_Caseload_Patent_Infringement_2.pdf (last visited Feb. 9, 2018). 
 64. See, e.g., Mock, supra note 51, at 28 (“Th[e] interplay between the PTAB and the Federal 
Circuit could lead to the court being overwhelmed by the number of appealable decisions coming 
out of the Patent Office, giving rise to the question of whether the system of post-grant proceedings, 
as currently constructed, is sustainable in the long term.”). 
 65. See Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 152 (1999). 
 66. See, e.g., In re De Blauwe, 736 F.2d 699, 703 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (“[T]he clearly erroneous 
standard … is applicable to fact findings.” (citing Raytheon Co. v. Roper Corp., 724 F.2d 951, 220 
(Fed. Cir. 1983))); see also In re Zurko (Zurko I), 142 F.3d 1447, 1457 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (stating 
that De Blauwe was the “first opinion of [the Federal Circuit] indicating that the clearly erroneous 
standard is applied to Board of Appeal fact finding.”). 
 67. Zurko, 527 U.S. at 153. 
 68. In re Zurko, 111 F.3d 887, 889 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (citing In re Bell, 991 F.2d 781, 784 (Fed. 
Cir. 1993)). 
 69. See Zurko, 527 U.S. at 153. 
 70. Id. at 154; accord In re Zurko, 142 F.3d at 1457–59 (upholding the application of the 
Patent Act’s clearly erroneous standard for factual findings of the Board because Congress, in 
passing the Administrative Procedure Act, did not indicate any departure from that standard). 
 71. See In re Zurko, 142 F.3d at 1452.  The Federal Circuit held: 
This history suggests that Congress drafted the APA to apply to agencies generally, but 
that because of existing common law standards and the availability of trial de novo 
pursuant to section 4915 of the Revised Statutes, the predecessor of 35 U.S.C. § 145, 
Congress did not intend the APA to alter the review of substantive Patent Office 
decisions. 
Id. 
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Circuit relied on the principal of stare decisis,72 which made the Federal Circuit 
reluctant to apply a different standard of review in light of the Board’s roughly 
twenty-year record of reviewing factual findings for clear error.73 
Dickinson, the Commissioner of the PTO at the time, appealed the Federal 
Circuit’s decision, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari to address whether 
Section 706 of the APA applies to Federal Circuit reviews of the PTO’s findings 
of fact.74  The Court rejected the Federal Circuit’s rationale and held that the 
appropriate standard of review to be used by the Federal Circuit, or any appellate 
court reviewing an agency decision, “must [be] the framework set forth in § 706” 
of the APA.75  Specifically, the Court stated that the Federal Circuit must review 
“an agency’s reasoning to determine whether it is ‘arbitrary’ or ‘capricious,’ or, 
if bound up with a record-based factual conclusion, to determine whether it is 
supported by ‘substantial evidence.’”76  As such, the Court concluded that the 
Federal Circuit, in reviewing the Board’s decisions regarding findings of fact, 
must apply the standards of review articulated in Section 706 of the APA.77  The 
Court further stated that because the Federal Circuit is a “specialized court,” its 
review of factual findings is “through the lens of patent-related experience,”78 
and thus, review by a court with technical patent expertise would “play a more 
important role in assuring proper review than would a theoretically somewhat 
stricter standard.”79 
On remand, the Federal Circuit concluded that “[t]he Board’s conclusion of 
obviousness was based on a misreading of the references relied upon and, 
therefore, lacks substantial evidence support.”80  Consequently, the Federal 
Circuit again reversed the Board’s final decision—even with the application of 
a different standard of review on remand.81 
As a result of the Supreme Court’s decision in Zurko, the Federal Circuit had 
to decide in In re Gartside whether it would apply the arbitrary and capricious 
or substantial evidence standard of review articulated in Section 706.82  The 
Federal Circuit explained that the arbitrary and capricious standard was a 
“default standard” that only applied when the substantial evidence standard did 
                                                 
 72. Id. at 1457 (invoking “the principle of stare decisis,” the idea that “Courts do not set aside 
long-standing practices absent a substantial reason”). 
 73. See id. 
 74. See Zurko, 527 U.S. at 152, 154. 
 75. Id. at 152. 
 76. Id. at 164 (citing SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 89–93 (1943); accord 7 ROBERT A. 
MATTHEWS, JR., ANNOTATED PATENT DIGEST § 43:74 (2017). 
 77. See Zurko, 527 U.S. at 164–65. 
 78. Id. at 163. 
 79. See id. 
 80. In re Zurko (Zurko II), 258 F.3d 1379, 1386 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
 81. Zurko I, 142 F.3d 1447, 1452, 1459 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
 82. In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305, 1312 (2000) (“We feel compelled to decide that question, 
in order to secure the standard of review through which we will test the decision of the Board in 
this case.”). 
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not.83  The Federal Circuit then determined that the substantial evidence standard 
applied to the Board’s factual findings because the Patent Act required the 
Federal Circuit to review Board adjudications on the record.  Thus, Board 
adjudications fell within the language of the APA’s substantial evidence 
standard.84  Therefore, the Federal Circuit decided that the substantial evidence 
standard should apply, not the arbitrary and capricious standard.85  As a result, 
the Federal Circuit reversed course from its previous decision that the APA did 
not apply to the Board.86  The Federal Circuit has since defined the substantial 
evidence standard of review as “something less than the weight of the evidence 
but more than a mere scintilla of evidence.”87 
The Federal Circuit continues to apply its holding in Gartside despite the 
many changes that have occurred to the Patent Act since 2000.88  Given the more 
trial-like nature of adjudications before the PTAB, it is problematic that courts 
are reviewing PTAB decisions under a standard developed for reviewing agency 
adjudications rather than a more searching standard developed for analyzing 
district court claim construction factual findings. 
D.  The Adoption of the Clear Error Standard for the Review of District Court 
Findings of Fact Made During Claim Construction 
As noted above, the Supreme Court recently addressed which standard of 
review applies when a district court decides questions of fact and whether 
findings of fact incidental to claim construction are questions of fact.  In Teva 
Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc,89 the Supreme Court seemingly 
clarified these two longstanding and controversial questions regarding the 
Federal Circuit’s standard of review for patent cases on appeal from the federal 
district courts.  In Teva, a pharmaceutical company filed a patent infringement 
claim against several competitors that had attempted to market a generic version 
of the multiple sclerosis drug Copaxone.90  The Supreme Court first explained 
that its holding in Markman applies even when the construction of a specific 
                                                 
 83. Substantial evidence of review is the most deferential standard that provides only “[t]he 
narrowest scope of judicial review,” whereas the substantial evidence standard “involves 
examination of the record as a whole, taking into account evidence that both justifies and detracts 
from an agency’s decision.”  Id. 
 84. Id. at 1313–14. 
 85. Id. at 1315. 
 86. Id. at 1316. 
 87. In re Kotzab, 217 F.3d 1365, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
 88. See MATTHEWS, supra note 76, at § 43:74 (“In accordance with the Zurko decision and 
the APA, the Federal Circuit has ruled that because findings and rulings by the PTO board are based 
on a full documentary record, it will review the board’s fact findings under the “substantial 
evidence” standard rather than the more deferential arbitrary and capricious standard.”); accord In 
re Cuozzo Speed Technologies, 793 F.3d 1268, 1280 (Fed. Cir. 2015); Merck & C.I.E. v. Gnosis, 
808 F.3d 829, 833 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
 89. 135 S. Ct. 831 (2015). 
 90. Id. at 835. 
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claim term involves underlying evidentiary findings.91  The Court summarized 
the issue quite succinctly: 
In Markman v. Westview Instruments, we explained that a patent claim 
is that “portion of the patent document that defines the scope of the 
patentee’s rights.”  We held that “the construction of a patent, 
including terms of art within its claim,” is not for a jury but 
“exclusively” for “the court” to determine.  That is so even where the 
construction of a term of art has “evidentiary underpinnings.”  Today’s 
case involves claim construction with “evidentiary underpinnings.”92 
The Court also had to determine whether the Federal Circuit “should use [the 
de novo or clearly erroneous standard of review] when it reviews a trial judge’s 
resolution of an underlying factual dispute.”93  In Teva, the Supreme Court held 
that although the ultimate construction of a legal claim is a legal conclusion 
warranting de novo review, the standard of review for a district court’s ruling on 
a subsidiary factual matter made during a district court’s construction of a patent 
claim cannot be overturned unless the factual findings are “clearly erroneous.”94  
The Supreme Court rested its decision primarily on Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 52(a)(6),95 explaining that this rule does not contain any exceptions 
for patent cases.96 
Furthermore, the Court determined that any factual disputes regarding 
extrinsic evidence during claim construction in district court are questions of 
fact.97  In other words, even when a district court judge weighs the credibility of 
competing extrinsic factual contentions presented at a claim construction 
hearing, these findings are solely findings of fact and not findings of law because 
                                                 
 91. Id. (citing Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 390 (1996)). 
 92. Teva, 135 S. Ct. at 835 (emphasis added). 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. at 836. 
 95. According to the rule, “[f]indings of fact, whether based on oral or other evidence, must 
not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and the reviewing court must give due regard to the trial 
court’s opportunity to judge the witnesses’ credibility.”  FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a)(6). 
 96. Teva, 135 S. Ct. at 836–837; see generally Keith Slenkovich, Katherine Lin & Michael 
Van Handel, Teva Pharmaceuticals v. Sandoz: New Rules for Claim Construction Review, BPLA 
NEWSLETTER (Boston Patent Law Ass’n, Quincy, Mass.), Mar. 15, 2015, http://www.bpla.org/? 
NewsL20150202Teva. 
 97. Teva, 135 S. Ct. at 841.  The Supreme Court explained the justification for its holding as 
follows: 
In some cases, . . . the district court will need to look beyond the patent’s intrinsic 
evidence and consult extrinsic evidence in order to understand, for example, the 
background science or the meaning of a term in the relevant art during the relevant time 
period. . . . In cases where [such] subsidiary facts are in dispute, courts will need to make 
subsidiary factual findings about that extrinsic evidence.  These are the “evidentiary 
underpinnings” of claim construction that we discussed in Markman . . . . 
Id. 
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Markman unequivocally articulated that claim construction is “exclusively” 
within the domain of the trial court to determine.98 
In settling these questions, the Court expressly overruled the Federal Circuit’s 
decision in Lighting Ballast Control LLC v. Philips Electronics North America 
Corp.,99 in which the Federal Circuit held that “patent claim construction 
receives de novo determination on appeal, that is, review for correctness as a 
matter of law.”100  Subsequently, the Federal Circuit applied the Teva holding in 
In re Cuozzo Speed Technologies,101 which involved an appeal of a claim 
construction determination in an inter partes review.102  As such, the Federal 
Circuit decided to apply Teva’s de novo standard of review to the ultimate claim 
construction finding by the PTAB, but has continued following Zurko’s 
substantial evidence standard as to the PTAB’s findings of underlying factual 
disputes.103 
E.  Arguments in Favor of and Against the Substantial Evidence Standard of 
Review 
1.  A Relevant Analysis Justifying the Federal Circuit’s Continued Use of the 
Substantial Evidence Standard 
Since Teva, scholars have attempted to justify the Federal Circuit’s continued 
use of the substantial evidence standard of review for PTAB findings of fact 
made incidental to claim construction.  For example, in a Note written by Alana 
Canfield Mannigé, she advocated that questions of fact made incidental to claim 
construction in IPRs should be reviewed for substantial evidence in accordance 
with the Supreme Court’s decision in Zurko.104  Mannigé based her conclusion 
on Section 706 of the APA and the requirement that administrative agency 
decisions in “formal” proceedings be reviewed for substantial evidence.105  To 
be considered formal under the APA, a proceeding must be “determined ‘on the 
record’ after the ‘opportunity for an agency hearing.’”106 
Mannigé argues that although the AIA does not explicitly identify IPRs as 
formal and IPRs do not require decisions to be made “on the record,” the Federal 
                                                 
 98. Id. (quoting Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 372 (1996)). 
 99. 744 F.3d 1272 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
 100. Id. at 1276. 
 101. 793 F.3d 1268, 1280 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
 102. Id. at 1279.  In applying Teva, the Federal Circuit majority did not expound upon whether 
the Supreme Court’s ruling would have any effect on the Circuit’s standard of review for inter 
partes reviews.  The majority stated, “we review underlying factual determinations concerning 
extrinsic evidence for substantial evidence and the ultimate construction of the claim de novo.  
Because there is no issue here as to extrinsic evidence, we review the claim construction de novo.”  
Id. at 1280 (internal citations omitted). 
 103. Id. 
 104. Mannigé, supra note 7, at 169–70. 
 105. Id. at 169 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (2012)). 
 106. 5 U.S.C. § 554. 
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Circuit will nonetheless treat IPRs as formal proceedings.107  Thus, she argued, 
“questions of fact during IPR should be reviewed for ‘substantial evidence.’”108  
Analogizing a similar argument made in the context of PGRs, she argued that 
IPRs should likewise “be treated as formal proceedings because they possess 
many of the hallmarks of formal adjudication, such as discovery and oral 
argument.”109  To support these assertions, Mannigé refered to the Federal 
Circuit’s conclusion in In re Gartside that substantial evidence should apply to 
appeals from PTO interference proceedings—a proceeding that is considered 
less formal than PGRs.110  Thus, factual findings regarding claim construction 
in inter partes proceedings and other PGRs should be reviewed in the same 
manner.111 
Adding to the chorus of criticism, Professor Paul J. Verkuil argued that the 
clearly erroneous standard discussed in Teva significantly resembles the 
substantial evidence standard currently used by courts when reviewing factual 
findings from an administrative agency.112  Professor Verkuil observed that the 
two standards statistically result in nearly identical outcomes despite both 
Congress’ and the Supreme Court’s attempts to meaningfully distinguish the 
two.113  Professor Amanda Peters echoes this sentiment, arguing that when 
comparing the application of the substantial evidence and clear error standards 
of review, “there is effectively no difference between [the two standards]” 
because they are both “so similar in their wording and application.”114  Likewise, 
Mannigé noted the Supreme Court’s commentary in Zurko: 
                                                 
 107. Mannigé, supra note 7, at 169. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at 169–70 (citing Melissa F. Wasserman, The Changing Guard of Patent Law: 
Chevron Deference for the PTO, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1959, 1981–86 (2013)) (arguing that 
Congress’ requirement that the Patent and Trademark Office permit oral arguments and discovery 
during post-grant review proceedings suggests that Congress wanted post-grant reviews to be 
treated like formal adjudications governed by the Administrative Procedure Act). 
 110. Id. at 170 (citing In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2000)). 
 111. Mannigé states: 
Even more telling is that in In re Gartside, the Federal Circuit decided that the substantial 
evidence standard of formal proceedings applies to appeals from PTO interference 
proceedings, which are less formal than the new AIA post-grant proceedings.  In In re 
Gartside, the Federal Circuit had based its conclusion partly on the fact that appeals from 
interferences were required to be reviewed “on the record” developed by the PTO.  The 
AIA has a similar requirement for IPR, requiring review to be based “on the record” 
developed by the PTO. 
Id. (footnotes omitted) (citing In re Gartside, 203 F.3d at 1313). 
 112. See generally Paul R. Verkuil, An Outcomes Analysis of Scope of Review Standards, 44 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 679 (2002) (discussing Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 
831, 836 (2015)). 
 113. Id. at 692–97 (“[Statistical] outcomes . . . sometimes converge between close cousins like 
the substantial evidence standard and clearly erroneous tests.”). 
 114. Amanda Peters, The Meaning, Measure, and Misuse of Standards of Review, 13 LEWIS & 
CLARK L. REV. 233, 245–46 (2009). 
178 Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 67:165 
The difference [between the standards of review] is a subtle one—so 
fine that (apart from the present case) we have failed to uncover a 
single instance in which a reviewing court conceded that use of one 
standard rather than the other would in fact have produced a different 
outcome.115 
As explained below, however, the different standards of review can result in 
distinctive outcomes depending on the factual record.  This issue is not merely 
an academic concern. 
2.  The Arguments for the Federal Circuit’s Use of the Clear and 
Convincing Standard of Review 
The continued use of the substantial evidence standard by the Federal Circuit 
in light of Teva has not occurred without controversy.116  Among the critics of 
the standard’s continued use are sitting judges in the Federal Circuit.  
Specifically, in its denial of the petition for rehearing en banc in Merck,117 
several judges questioned whether the continued adherence to the substantial 
evidence standard is the appropriate standard of review for any PTAB factual 
determinations.118  Judge O’Malley, for example, in concurring with the per 
curium denial of a rehearing, remarked that the “application of the substantial 
evidence standard of review [wa]s . . . seemingly inconsistent with the purpose 
. . . of the AIA.”119  Nevertheless, she stated that she was “bound by binding 
Supreme Court precedent,” and therefore concurred with the majority’s reliance 
                                                 
 115. Mannigé, supra note 7, at 170–71 (quoting Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 162–63 
(1999)). 
 116. See id. at 161 (“[T]his Note argues that the appropriate standard of review [for questions 
of fact] is the substantial evidence standard.”).  Some commentators are uncertain as to whether the 
standard of review in which the Federal Circuit now reviews factual findings will make a 
substantive difference.  See, e.g., Stephanie A. Quick, The New Standard of Claim Construction 
After Teva, LANDSLIDE MAG., Sept.–Oct. 2016, at 49, 50–51 (“Until the Federal Circuit reviews 
more claim construction orders, it remains to be seen how this “new” standard will affect patent 
litigation.”). 
 117. Merck & Cie v. Gnosis S.P.A., 808 F.3d 829 (Fed. Cir. 2015), reh’g denied per curium, 
820 F.3d 432 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 
 118. Merck, 820 F.3d at 433–38 (O’Malley, Wallach & Stoll, JJ., concurring in the denial of 
the petition for rehearing en banc) (Newman, J., dissenting from the denial of the petition for 
rehearing en banc) (per curium). 
 119. Id. at 433 (O’Malley, Wallach & Stoll, JJ., concurring in the denial of the petition for 
rehearing en banc). 
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on the substantial evidence standard.120  Her concurrence is particularly 
noteworthy, as she was previously a district court judge.121 
Perhaps the Federal Circuit’s most outspoken critic of the substantial evidence 
standard of review is Judge Newman.  According to Judge Newman, the 
standard conflicts with the AIA’s purpose of “providing quick and cost-effective 
alternatives to litigation.”122  Because the Federal Circuit is the only court 
permitted to review PTAB decisions, she argued that it was improper for the 
Circuit “to review the PTAB decision under the highly deferential ‘substantial 
evidence’ standard.”123  Some commentators agree and have relied on her 
opinions to highlight the importance of using the appropriate standard of 
review.124 
According to Judge Newman, the use of the clear error standard is consistent 
with the use of a lower evidentiary burden of proof used in AIA proceedings.125  
The PTAB only requires a preponderance of the evidence to prove invalidity of 
a patent.126  Dissenting in Merck, Judge Newman acknowledged that although 
                                                 
 120. Judge O’Malley added: 
Because Congress failed to expressly change the standard of review employed by this 
court in reviewing Board decisions when it created IPR proceedings via the AIA, we are 
not free to do so now. . . . I write separately, however, because I agree with the dissent to 
the extent it argues that a substantial evidence standard of review makes little sense in 
the context of an appeal from an IPR proceeding. 
Id. (O’Malley, Wallach & Stoll, JJ., concurring in the denial of the petition for rehearing en banc). 
 121. Judges, U.S. CT. APPEALS FED. CIR., http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/judges/kathleen-m-
omalley-circuit-judge (last visited November 23, 2017). 
 122. See In re Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC, 793 F.3d 1268, 1284 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (Newman, J., 
dissenting); Merck, 808 F.3d at 845 (Newman, J., dissenting) (“The PTAB is not an examining 
body, but an adjudicatory body, an objective arbiter between opposing parties.”); accord 157 
CONG. REC. S1052, S1053 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 2011) (statement of Sen. Whitehouse) 
(“Administrative processes that should serve as an alternative to litigation have also broken down, 
resulting in further delay, cost, and confusion.”); 157 CONG. REC. S5326, S5327 (daily ed. Sept. 6, 
2011) (statement of Sen. Leahy) (“This bill will establish a more efficient and streamlined patent 
system that will improve patent quality and limit unnecessary and counterproductive litigation 
costs, while make sure no party’s access to court is denied.”). 
 123. Merck, 808 F.3d at 840 (Newman, J., dissenting).  She invoked the words of the Supreme 
Court: 
Reviewing courts are not obliged to stand aside and rubberstamp their affirmance of 
administrative decisions that they deem inconsistent with a statutory mandate or that 
frustrate the congressional policy underlying a statute.  Such review is always properly 
within the judicial province, and courts would abdicate their responsibility if they did not 
fully review such administrative decisions. 
Id. at 839–40 (Newman, J., dissenting) (quoting N.L.R.B. v. Brown, 330 U.S. 278, 291–92 (1965)). 
 124. See, e.g., Richard G. Gervase, Jr. & Peter J. Cuomo, Fed. Cir. Defers to PTAB Finding of 
Obviousness in First Pharma IPR Reviews (Merck v. Gnosis), MINTZ LEVIN (Dec. 21, 2015), 
https://www.mintz.com/legal-insights/alerts/. 
 125. Merck, 808 F.3d at 841(Newman, J., dissenting). 
 126. 35 U.S.C. § 316(e) (2012) (“In an inter partes review instituted under this chapter, the 
petitioner shall have the burden of proving a proposition of unpatentability by a preponderance of 
the evidence.”); id. § 326(e) (“In a post-grant review instituted under this chapter, the petitioner 
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judicial review of agency findings upon the preponderance standard was “not 
the general APA rule, [it] has been adopted by statute in other situations.”127  
Moreover, she added that sister circuits “have interpreted the preponderance 
standard to require review for ‘clear error’ on appeal.”128 
Judge Newman argued that the APA included the substantial evidence 
standard only because the administrative agencies reviewing these decisions 
utilized “the expertise of specialized agencies.”129  However, in her view, 
Congress passed the AIA because it determined that the Patent Office was 
making too many mistakes.130  Judge Newman contended that this standard of 
review “is critical to the legislative balance of the [AIA].”131 
Judge Newman’s opinions, particularly with respect to the burden of proof, 
highlight the underlying flaws in the majority’s adoption of such a deferential 
standard of review for factual findings made incidental to claim construction. 
3.  Other Arguments Grounded in the Language of the APA Favor the 
Clearly Erroneous Standard 
Following the Federal Circuit’s denial for rehearing, Merck & Cie filed a 
petition for a writ of certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court, which was 
subsequently denied.132  In its petition, Merck & Cie argued that the substantial 
evidence standard of review was inapplicable to all factual findings made by the 
PTAB.  Specifically, it emphasized that Section 559 of the APA contains two 
distinct exceptions to the standards of review enumerated in Section 706 of the 
APA.133 
                                                 
shall have the burden of proving a proposition of unpatentability under a preponderance of the 
evidence.”). 
 127. Merck, 808 F.3d at 841 (Newman, J., dissenting).  Judge Newman points to the Service 
Contract Act, where the preponderance of the evidence standard of review was employed by statute 
as opposed to the substantial evidence standard required under the APA.  Judge Newman contends 
that this the legislature can adopt different standards of review in “special situations.” Id.  
(Newman, J., dissenting) (citing 41 U.S.C. § 6507(e) (2012)). 
 128. Id.  (Newman, J., dissenting) (stating that “determination by the administrator . . . must 
be affirmed unless it is not supported by a preponderance of the evidence.” (citing Amcor, Inc. v. 
Brock, 780 F.2d 897, 901 (11th Cir. 1986))). 
 129. Id. (Newman, J., dissenting). 
 130. Id. at 840–41 (Newman, J., dissenting).  Judge Newman demonstrates Congress’ 
disapproval of the quality of the patents coming out of the Patent Office.  Id. (Newman, J., 
dissenting) (“This will allow invalid patents that were mistakenly issued by the PTO to be fixed 
early in their life, before they disrupt an entire industry or result in expensive litigation.” (citing 
157 CONG. REC. S1326 (daily ed. Mar. 7, 2011) (statement of Sen. Sessions))).  The IPR process, 
specifically, was created partially as a response to the increasing number of non-practicing entity, 
or “patent troll” litigations, whereby defendants could challenge the validity of an asserted troll 
patent without incurring the high cost of the formal litigation process in the District Court.  See 
Mannigé, supra note 7, at 159. 
 131. Merck, 808 F.3d at 841 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
 132. Merck & Cie v. Gnosis, S.P.A., 137 S. Ct. 279 (2016) (mem.). 
 133. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 2, Merck, 137 S. Ct. 279 (No. 16-125). 
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The first exception was addressed in both Zurko and Gartside and applies 
whenever “additional requirements are imposed by a pre-APA statute or a settled 
practice recognized by law.”134  The second exception is referred to as the 
“express-reference requirement” and applies whenever “a post-APA statute 
‘expressly’ excludes the APA’s review standards.”135  Although the AIA does 
not expressly exclude PTAB proceedings from the APA’s review standards, 
Merck & Cie argued that the second exception in Section 559 may still apply.  
Because a court could find implicit invocation of the desire for a more searching 
standard of review by examining the AIA’s “policy, objectives, and design,”136 
Congress did not need “magical passwords” to invoke the express-reference 
exception.137  Therefore, according to Merck & Cie, the Supreme Court should 
exempt the AIA proceedings from the APA’s substantial evidence standard and 
instead apply the clear error standard.  This, Merck & Cie argued, would 
effectuate Congress’ intent with the AIA “to restore the public’s confidence in 
the patent system” and provide parties an alternative to district courts.138 
In short, Merck & Cie argued that Congress intended the PTAB’s 
administrative judges to “quickly and efficiently” reach “correct determinations 
as to patent validity based on evidence presented by opposing parties in a trial-
like environment.”139  Because the overarching goal is correctness, “appellate 
review of PTAB fact-findings cannot be premised on mere substantial 
evidence.”140  Merck & Cie argued that because the “substantial error standard 
does not address whether the correct decision was made, but merely whether 
there is some evidence in the record to support the findings,” it was the improper 
standard to apply in PTAB cases.141  It argued, rather, that “Congress intended 
IPR fact-findings to be review under a more rigorous standard,” like that of the 
clear error standard of review.142 
II.  THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT SHOULD ADOPT THE CLEAR ERROR STANDARD OF 
REVIEW FOR FACTUAL FINDINGS MADE BY THE PTAB INCIDENTAL TO CLAIM 
CONSTRUCTION 
Judge Newman and other commentators have persuasively argued that the 
application of the substantial evidence standard to review factual findings made 
                                                 
 134. Id. at 2–3. 
 135. Id. at 2 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 559 (2012)). 
 136. Id. at 4 (citing Lockhart v. United States, 546 U.S. 142, 148 (2005) (Scalia, J., 
concurring)). 
 137. Id. at 4 (quoting Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302, 310 (1955)). 
 138. Id. at 4–5. 
 139. Id. at 5, 11 (“[D]etermining the proper appellate review standard for fact-findings in IPR 
proceedings is critical to effectuate Congress’s objectives for the AIA.”). 
 140. Id. at 5 (“Such deference to the agency—which itself employs no internal, second-tier 
review in IPR proceedings—severely compromises the balance that Congress sought.”). 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. 
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incidental to claim construction fails to consider Congress’ intent in passing the 
AIA.143  Merck & Cie’s argument that AIA proceedings should not fall within 
the scope of Section 706 is similarly persuasive.  Unfortunately, because the 
Supreme Court, in denying Merck & Cie’s petition for a writ of certiorari, 
declined to clarify the standard of review,144 the issue remains uncertain in the 
context of AIA proceedings.145  Although some argue the Supreme Court settled 
the matter of appellate standards of review between district courts and the 
PTO,146 controversies over law and policy remain and must be resolved to ensure 
the reliable administration of the system created under the AIA. 
A.  The Current Scholarship Supporting the Continued Reliance on the 
Substantial Evidence Standard Fails to Account for the Other Exemption 
Provisions of the APA that are Explicitly Discussed in Merck & Cie’s Petition 
for Writ of Certiorari 
The current scholarship fails to account for the exemption provisions of the 
APA.  For example, Alana Canfield Mannigé justified the Federal Circuit’s 
continued reliance on Zurko by arguing that the APA implicitly requires judicial 
review of PTAB factual findings during claim construction to be made under the 
substantial evidence standard.147  As noted, Mannagé based her argument on 
Section 706(2)(e), which states that courts review factual findings for substantial 
evidence when made in proceedings deemed “formal” under the APA.148  
Analogizing review of inter partes claim construction to Professor Wasserman’s 
analysis of IPRs, she argued that because the Federal Circuit, in In re Gartside, 
applied the substantial evidence standard to appeals from PTO interference 
proceedings, any AIA proceeding that is more formal than PTO interference 
proceedings should also be afforded the substantial evidence standard of 
review.149  But, as explained below, the formality of PTAB proceedings should 
exempt the PTAB from the APA’s standards of review for factual findings. 
The fact that these inter partes PTAB proceedings “possess many of the 
hallmarks of formal adjudication” support the conclusions in Merck & Cie’s 
petition for writ of certiorari.150  Merck & Cie’s reference to the other exception 
of Section 706 carved out in Section 559 of the APA is more persuasive than 
Mannigé’s argument justifying the continued application of the substantial 
evidence standard.  Merck & Cie argued that the express-reference exception 
                                                 
 143. See discussion infra Section II.B. 
 144. See Merck & Cie v. Gnosis, S.P.A., 808 F.3d 829 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 137 S. 
Ct. 297 (2016). 
 145. See Gervase & Cuomo, supra note 124. 
 146. See discussion supra Section I.C, E.1. 
 147. See Mannigé, supra note 7, at 169–71. 
 148. Id. at 169–70; accord discussion supra Section I.E.1. 
 149. Mannigé, supra note 7, at 169–70. 
 150. Compare id. at 169, with Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 133, at 12. 
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can exempt a reviewing court from the APA standards of review if a post-APA 
statute “expressly” states that the APA standards of review are excluded.151 
Although the AIA does not contain an express provision excluding the AIA 
from the APA, the Supreme Court said that “statutes enacted by one Congress 
cannot bind a later Congress, which remains free . . . to exempt the current statute 
from the earlier statute.”152  Indeed, as Merck & Cie pointed out, the Supreme 
Court has gone even further and held that despite the use of the word “express” 
in the APA, Congress does not need to use “magical passwords” to later exempt 
itself from a subsequent statute; thus, it can exempt itself though “fair 
implication.” 153  That fair implication arises from the legislative history 
indicating that the AIA and its IPR procedures were meant to establish a “patent 
system that w[ould] improve patent quality”154 by correcting agency mistakes 
that “resulted in too many low quality patents.”155 
Due to the formal nature of IPRs, a proper analysis must account for Congress’ 
inclusion of this formality into PTAB proceedings, which were inherently 
designed to be an alternative to district court litigation.156  In seeking correct 
decisions regarding the validity of patents, Congress intended to create a 
mechanism that could ensure the correction of “agency mistakes that had 
resulted in too many low quality patents.”157  Therefore, Congress intended AIA 
reviews to be an alternative to litigation, and as such, they should be exempted 
from the APA’s proscribed standards of review.  Accordingly, it is illogical to 
conclude that Congress intended for a reviewing court to apply the substantial 
evidence standard, which asks whether there was enough information to 
plausibly support the PTAB’s conclusion.158  In other words, if the PTAB is 
supposed to serve as a viable alternative to district court litigation over 
                                                 
 151. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 133, at 15–16. 
 152. Dorsey v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2321, 2331 (2012). 
 153. Id. at 2331–32 (citing Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302, 310 (1955)); see also Petition for 
Writ of Certiorari, supra note 133, at 15; accord Lockhart v. United States, 546 U.S. 142, 148 
(2005) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“A subsequent Congress . . . may exempt itself from such 
requirements by “fair implication”—that is, without an express statement.” (quoting Warden v. 
Marrero, 417 U.S. 653, 659–60 n.10 (1974))). 
 154. H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, pt. 1, at 40 (2011), as reprinted in 2011 U.S.C.C.A.N. 67, 69. 
 155. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 133, at 19 (citing CONG. REC. H10276 (daily 
ed. Sept. 7, 2007) (statement of Rep. Goodlatte) (commenting that the AIA’s proceedings were an 
“additional check on the issuance of bogus patents”)). 
 156. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, pt. 1, at 45–48; 157 CONG. REC. S5326, S5326-27 (daily 
ed. Sept. 6, 2011) (statement of Sen. Leahy); 157 CONG. REC. S1052, S1053 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 
2011) (statement of Sen. Whitehouse). 
 157. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 133, at 19 (citing 153 CONG. REC. H10276 
(daily ed. Sept. 7, 2007) (statement of Rep. Goodlatte) (“The PTO, like any other large government 
agency makes mistakes.  [The AIA, as proposed,] creates a post-grant opposition procedure to allow 
the private sector to challenge a patent just after it is approved to provide an additional check on 
the issuance of bogus patents.”). 
 158. See id. at 20 (citing 3 STEVEN ALAN CHILDRESS & MARTHA S. DAVIS, FEDERAL 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW § 15.04 (4th ed. 2010)). 
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patentability, courts should review PTAB decisions using the same standard 
district courts use for factual findings. 
Additionally, as critics have noted, the PTAB construes patent claims in a 
manner that uses the “broadest reasonable interpretation,”159 which the Federal 
Circuit has frequently upheld.160  This is the same standard of review patent 
examiners apply.161  However, applying a standard of review that provides 
additional deference to the PTAB squarely contradicts Congress’ intent to ensure 
that correct patentability conclusions are reached.  Accordingly, the appropriate 
standard to ensure correct patentability conclusions is the clear error standard. 
B.  The Current Scholarship Fails to Grasp the Marked Differences Between 
the Substantial Evidence and Clear Error Standards of Review 
Lastly, the arguments denying any substantive difference between the 
substantial evidence and clearly erroneous standards of review are overly 
inclusive.  Such arguments rely almost exclusively on the Supreme Court’s 
remarks in Zurko that the substantial evidence and clearly erroneous standards 
                                                 
 159. 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) (2017) (“A claim in an unexpired patent shall be given its broadest 
reasonable construction in light of the specification of the patent in which it appears.”).  In the 
PTO’s official commentary, regulators stated that the “broadest reasonable interpretation” (BRI) 
standard was consistent with the congressional intent of the enabling statute, adding: “This rule is 
also consistent with longstanding established principles of claim construction before the Office.”  
Changes to Implement Inter Partes Review Proceedings, Post-Grant Review Proceedings, and 
Transitional Program for Covered Business Method Patents, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,680, 48,688 (Aug. 14, 
2012) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 42).  The PTO elaborated: 
For nearly thirty years, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has 
continued to require the Office to give patent claims their broadest reasonable 
construction consistent with the specification in patentability determination proceedings. 
. . . The “broadest reasonable interpretation” standard has been well established nearly 
thirty years in the judicial precedent for construing patent claims in patentability 
determination proceedings before the Office. 
77 Fed. Reg. at 48,697. 
 160. See In re Cuozzo Speed Tech., LLC, 793 F.3d 1268, 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“[T]he 
broadest reasonable interpretation standard has been applied by the PTO and its predecessor for 
more than 100 years in various types of PTO proceedings.”).  The Federal Circuit explained its 
reliance on the BRI standard as follows: 
This court has approved of the broadest reasonable interpretation standard in a variety of 
proceedings . . . . Indeed, that standard has been applied in every PTO proceeding 
involving unexpired patents. . . . 
There is no indication that the AIA was designed to change the claim construction 
standard that the PTO has applied for more than 100 years. . . . 
Moreover, Congress in enacting the AIA was well aware that the broadest reasonable 
interpretation standard was the prevailing rule. 
. . . . 
We conclude that Congress implicitly approved the broadest reasonable interpretation 
standard in enacting the AIA. 
Id. at 1276–78. 
 161. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE 
§ 2111.01 (9th ed. 2014). 
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of review are very similar.162  However, the Court’s comment can be seen more 
as an aberration than precedent.  For example, the Supreme Court has 
determined in other cases that the substantial evidence standard of review 
affords such a high degree of deference to an administrative agency decision that 
“the possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does 
not prevent an administrative agency’s findings from being supported by 
substantial evidence.”163  In contrast, the Court reiterated in Teva that “clear 
error review is ‘particularly’ important where patent law is at issue because 
patent law is ‘a field where so much depends upon familiarity with specific 
scientific problems and principles not usually contained in the general 
storehouse of knowledge and experience.’”164 
In practice, applying the clearly erroneous standard rather than the substantial 
evidence standard can, and sometimes does, yield different results.  Dissenting 
in Merck, Judge Newman applied the clearly erroneous standard of review and 
arrived at a different conclusion than the panel majority.165  Upon a closer look 
at the prior art, Judge Newman revealed that although substantial evidence 
supported the majority’s conclusion, such evidence does not necessarily ensure 
that the PTAB reached the correct determination.166 
                                                 
 162. See Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 162–63 (1999) (“[T]he difference [between the 
clear error and substantial evidence standards] is a subtle one—so fine that (apart from the present 
case) we have failed to uncover a single instance in which a reviewing court conceded that use of 
one standard rather than the other would in fact have produced a different outcome.”). 
 163. See Consolo v. Fed. Mar. Comm’n, 383 U.S. 607, 619–20 (1966) (“We have defined 
‘substantial evidence’ as ‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to 
support a conclusion.’” (quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., 305 U.S. 197, 
229 (1938))); accord Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 133, at 20. 
 164. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 838 (2015) (quoting Graver Tank 
& Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 610 (1950)). 
 165. Merck & Cie v. Gnosis S.P.A., 808 F.3d 829, 842–43 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (Newman, J., 
dissenting). 
 166. In applying the clear error standard, Judge Newman concluded: 
The evidence of record does not support the PTAB’s apparent assumption that any folate 
would be effective against elevated homocysteine.  No reference teaches that L–5–
MTHF has this activity.  A prima facie case cannot be based on the inventor’s successful 
investigations. 
The PTAB states that “Serfontein calls for a ‘suitably active metabolite of folate’ in 
preparations used to correct folate deficiency and treat diseases associated with elevated 
levels of homocysteine.”  This statement appears to enlarge Serfontein, who uses folate 
for “lowering levels of homocysteine or . . . counteracting the harmful effects associated 
with homocysteine.” 
The PTAB states that “Marazza specifically identifies chirally-pure L-5-MTHF as an 
active metabolite of folate suitable for use as a therapeutic agent in folate deficient 
states.”  The PTAB combines the Serfontein and Marazza references because “the close 
similarity of purpose and disclosure between these references would have provided 
sufficient rationale for one of ordinary skill in the art to have combined the teachings 
therein.”  However, there is no suggestion to select and make such combination with a 
reasonable expectation of success in treating elevated homocysteine.  The only source of 
this concept is hindsight reconstruction using the teachings of these inventors. 
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Had the Federal Circuit applied the clearly erroneous standard, as suggested 
by Judge Newman, the Federal Circuit would have determined that the PTAB 
cited no source for finding a motivation to combine the prior art references.167  
In other words, by following the substantial evidence standard, the majority 
opinion disregarded the evidence weighing against the PTAB’s finding that a 
reasonable expectation of success existed to combine the references.168  By 
failing to consider this evidence, the Federal Circuit demonstrated that 
“[d]eferential review on a standard that looks only at one side of the evidence is 
less likely to uncover [the PTAB’s] errors in the balance and burden of proof.”169 
C.  The Disparate Appellate Standard of Review Between the Federal District 
Court and the PTAB May Lead to Unfair Outcomes 
PTAB trials have been immensely popular, and statistics suggest that they will 
continue to be in the future.170  In fact, studies suggest that the number of appeals 
may double by 2020.171  Moreover, PTO statistics show that the PTAB is 
generally favorable to petitioners,172 with roughly two-thirds of IPR trials that 
                                                 
Id. (Newman, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted). 
 167. See id. (Newman, J., dissenting) (“Only hindsight [could have] provide[d] such 
prophesy.”).  Instead, the majority opinion applied the substantial evidence standard of review and 
determined that there was no need to scrutinize the validity of the factual finding made by the 
PTAB.  Id. at 842 (Newman, J., dissenting) (“[T]he majority decides that ‘substantial evidence’ 
supports the PTAB’s finding of a motivation to combine the information in the Serfontein and 
Marazza references.”). 
 168. Such evidence included clinical observations that raised questions of uncertainty in 
combining the two references, Merck & Cie’s commercial success, and the evidence showing a 
“long-felt need, failure of others, industry praise, licensing, and copying.”  Id. (Newman, J., 
dissenting). 
 169. See id. (Newman, J., dissenting). 
 170. See Rob Sterne & Gene Quinn, PTAB Death Squads: Are All Commercially Viable 
Patents Invalid?, IPWATCHDOG (Mar. 24, 2014), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2014/03/24/ptab-
death-squads-are-all-commercially-viable-patents-invalid/id=48642/; accord Golden, supra note 
32, at 1669. 
 171. See Mock, supra note 51, at 30–34.  Based on his analysis, Jason Mock warns: 
[T]he number of appeals could exceed 2,000 as early as 2018, and would gradually 
continue to increase as it reaches a new steady state shortly after 2023.  If these 
projections are correct, they indicate that the Federal Circuit could expect its number of 
appeals to roughly double within the next five years.  This would be a monumental 
burden on the court, which could result in issues ranging from the allocation of additional 
resources for the judges and clerks to potentially lengthening the mean disposition for 
time for appeals from 10.6 months to well over a year. 
Id. at 34 (footnotes omitted). 
 172. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD 
STATISTICS 10 (Oct. 31, 2016), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/aia_statistics_ 
october2016.pdf; see also Jordan Klimek, Patents as Regulations: How the America Invents Act 
and the Seminole Rock Doctrine Could Change Claim Construction After Teva v. Sandoz, 97 J. 
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 307, 325 (2015) (“PTAB proceedings, especially IPR, have the 
advantage of tilting the procedural playing field toward patent challengers.”); accord Cutler, supra 
note 6. 
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end in final written decisions finding all instituted claims unpatentable.173  An 
additional sixteen percent of IPR trials that end in final written decisions find 
that some, but not all, of the instituted claims are unpatentable.174  As such, AIA 
proceedings will likely remain an attractive forum for parties to challenge the 
validity of a patent. 
The overwhelming success of these proceedings has led some practitioners to 
speculate that rather than simply eliminating deficient patents, the PTAB is 
instead being used as a weapon by companies “seeking to punch holes in a 
competitor’s patent portfolio.”175  This success, and arguable abuse of the system 
by some petitioners, may be due not only to the lower burden of proof in these 
proceedings, but also to the highly deferential substantial evidence standard of 
review, which insulates final decisions that are favorable to petitioners.  The 
Federal Circuit has disproportionately affirmed PTAB decisions because the 
court fails to employ a more searching standard to review factual findings made 
by the PTAB incidental to claim construction.176 
However, if the Federal Circuit adopts the clearly erroneous standard of 
review to factual findings made incident to claim construction, it will have the 
opportunity to save patents that the PTAB improperly invalidated.  The PTAB 
provides petitioners with an alternative to district courts that is faster, more cost-
effective and requires a lesser burden of proof.  Given the power of these newly-
created proceedings, it is important to ensure that these proceedings are 
conducted fairly and in full consideration of the underlying facts often at the 
heart of claim construction rulings. 
D.  The Federal District Court and PTAB Standards of Review for Factual 
Findings Made Incidental to Claim Construction Should Be Harmonized 
There are many ways in which the Federal Circuit or the PTAB could modify 
the current standards of review for factual findings.  However, it is the role of 
Congress to enact a comprehensive and binding solution.  Congress can amend 
the statutes to harmonize the standards of review in the PTAB and district courts.  
Given Congress’ enhanced ability to conduct research and hear varying 
viewpoints, Congress is best seated to modify the current trajectory of the PTAB 
and Federal Circuit. 
In fact, Congress has looked more closely at IPR practice.  Most notably, in 
the 114th Congress, Senators Grassley, Leahy, Cornyn, Schumer, Lee, Hatch, 
and Klobuchar introduced the Protecting American Talent and Entrepreneurship 
Act of 2015 (PATENT Act).177  Particularly, Section 11 of the current draft of 
                                                 
 173. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 172, at 10. 
 174. Id. 
 175. See Cutler, supra note 6. 
 176. See discussion supra Section II.A. 
 177. Protecting American Talent and Entrepreneurship Act of 2015, S. 1137, 114th Cong. 
(2015). 
188 Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 67:165 
the PATENT Act provides that the PTAB may choose not to institute an IPR if 
the review would not “serve the interests of justice.”178  This provision could 
potentially protect patent holders against abusive practices by competitors.  
Additionally, the PATENT Act would bar “an inter partes review from being 
instituted on the basis that the evidentiary standard before the USPTO differs 
from that used in a U.S. Court.”179 
Perhaps most importantly, the PATENT Act calls for claims in AIA 
proceedings to be construed according to their ordinary and customary meaning, 
rather than the broadest, reasonable interpretation standard utilized by the 
PTAB.180  Because the PTAB and the district courts under this bill would be 
construing patents using the same approach, Teva’s clearly erroneous standard 
of review should extend to Federal Circuit review of PTAB factual findings 
incidental to claim construction. 
The PATENT Act is evidence that some members of Congress are aware of 
the issues and are attempting to improve proceedings at the PTAB.  If legislation 
like the PATENT Act were passed, the Federal Circuit could accord the PTAB 
decisions the same deference it accords district court decisions.  Thus, Congress 
should ensure the PATENT Act to explicitly provide that the APA does not 
apply to AIA proceedings. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
Congress enacted the AIA, in part, to provide an efficient way to eliminate 
deficient patents.  However, the nature of the AIA proceedings and the 
deferential review of PTAB decisions have resulted in the elimination of nearly 
all patents, including some that would otherwise survive scrutiny in a district 
court litigation.  Changes to the system can and should be made to ensure that a 
proper balance is achieved because patent owners currently have an 
approximately seven percent chance of a Federal Circuit reversal of a PTAB 
decision.181  As explained above, the applied standard of review for factual 
findings made by the PTAB during claim construction should be revised so that 
the Federal Circuit can correct unsupported PTAB decisions that improperly 
invalidate valid patents.  Ample support exists for the adoption of the clear error 
standard of review of factual findings made incidental to claim construction. 
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